Username
Password

» Lost your Password?

Archives page

Posts Tagged ‘ODNI’

Sorting out the ODNI’s World Threat Assessment

DNI James Clapper has delivered the Intelligence Community’s annual Worldwide Threat Assessment to Congress. In downbeat opening remarks, he reeled off a depressing set of numbers:  60 million people around the world are reckoned to have been displaced; central government authority has collapsed in seven countries; violent extremists are operationally active in 40 countries; and 59 countries face a significant risk of instability. Clapper called instability the “new normal.”

The threat assessment itself was as usual divided into GLOBAL and REGIONAL sections. Both displayed a high proportion of bad news to good.

IC’s View Of Global Threats

Cyber

Not surprisingly, CYBER took pole position on the list of GLOBAL threats, with new concerns relating to the Internet of Things and the deployment of Artificial Intelligence technologies. While the list of bad actors still includes Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and terrorists generally, new vulnerabilities are anticipated from augmented reality and virtual reality systems. Referencing the Juniper Networks hack, Clapper noted that, in the cyber realm, the trend away from crude denial-of-service to sophisticated attacks designed to undermine data integrity has continued.

Terrorism

The global threat from TERRORISM has undergone a significant change over the last 12 months. According to the Assessment, Al-Qaeda has been “severely degraded.” ISIL’s emergence as the pre-eminent threat has increased concerns about both “terrorist travel” and home-grown violent extremists (HVEs) in the U.S, with other terror groups including Boko Haram and al-Shabaab discussed primarily in terms of their relation to ISIL. Finally, the Assessment notes that the difficulties experienced by host nations in relation to massive population displacements may make refugees targets for terrorist recruiters.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The IC’s perception of the threat presented by WMD has been little modified since the 2015 Assessment, with continuing concerns about North Korea, China and Russia. The picture in Iran is more complex. While the diplomatic initiatives culminating in the State Department’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have provided the international community with improved oversight of the country’s nuclear program, it is still concerned with enhancing its security, prestige, and regional influence. Widespread reports about ISIL’s use of mustard gas have resulted in Iraq joining Syria as a potential site for chemical weapon deployments.

Lastly, the increasing availability of genetic technology has led to GENOME EDITING appearing on the WMD list.

Outer Space

IC’s assessment of threats in SPACE shows a substantial increase in the number of potential actors, with some 80 nations now participating. Russia and China have developed new COUNTERSPACE capabilities. Russia, which has touted its use of satellite capabilities in support of its Syrian campaign, likely considers countering the U.S. space advantage to be a critical component of warfighting.

Counterintelligence

The COUNTERINTELLIGENCE threat environment remains complex, with Russia and China still heading up a long list of potential state and non-state actors who would seek to penetrate and influence U.S. national decision making. Increasingly sophisticated IT is now the primary vehicle for their actions.

Organized Crime

IC’s assessment of the threat from ORGANIZED CRIME has shifted to place additional emphasis on drug trafficking, but human and wildlife trafficking, and the role of crime in promoting corruption are still referenced.

Human Security

In HUMAN SECURITY, atrocities, global displacement, and climate change have joined extreme weather and infectious disease as significant threats. The growing global consensus on climate change is viewed as cause for optimism, but the health threat presented by the Zika virus is taken as indicative of the potential risks of entirely new diseases arising from human encroachment into animal habitats.

IC’s View Of Regional Threats

IC takes the view that, while great power competition is increasing, the geopolitical environment continues to offer opportunities for the U.S. to co-operate with other nations. However, an international environment defined by such a mix of competition and cooperation will likely undermine existing international institutions.

In the MIDDLE EAST, SYRIA continues to dominate the agenda because of the four million refugees displaced by conflict into Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq. IC assesses that the country’s government will be able to make gains against ISIL, but won’t be able to fundamentally alter its battlespace. Conditions in IRAQ are considered to be improving as ISIL rule falters and sectarian strife is reduced. However, the Iraqi Sunni population’s fearfulness of the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad may hinder efforts at uniting against ISIL.

IRAN presents an enduring threat despite its adoption of the JCPOA and release of 10 U.S. sailors because of its support for regional terrorism and for the Assad regime. In LIBYA, the conflict between two governments in Tripoli and Tobruk has hardened divisions within the country, and damaged the economy, leaving a power vacuum that has been exploited by terror groups. YEMEN’s conflict also remains stalemated, but all sides — plus international backers like IRAN — have expressed willingness to participate in peace talks. LEBANON continues to struggle with spillover from SYRIA. EGYPT faces persistent threats from domestic terrorists directed primarily against state security forces. TUNISIA also faces an ongoing terror threat and high unemployment, but its year-old democratic government gives some hope for the future.

TURKEY, still key to U.S. objectives in the region, is dealing with renewed concerns about the actions of its Kurdish minority, now being courted by Russia in relation to its Syria campaign. It is also dealing with a substantial refugee problem arising from the conflict in SYRIA.

In EURASIA, Russia continues to reassert its status as a great power, using its expanded role and continuing military success in Syria for leverage. Putin’s standing remains at a record high two years after the land grab he orchestrated in Ukraine, despite its negative impact on Russia’s steadily contracting economy. UKRAINE, MOLDOVA and BELARUS are seeking equilibrium with their increasingly strident neighbor. Regional tensions between GEORGIA and RUSSIA and between ARMENIA and AZERBAIJAN remain high, and it seems likely that RUSSIA will seek to increase its influence in the area because of its concerns about terrorist instability.

CHINA continues to dominate the entire context of ASIA, extending its influence on the world stage while conducting an ongoing program of ambitious economic and legal reforms. In NORTH KOREA, Kim Jong Un has strengthened his unitary power and renewed focus on the country’s military program via provocative and threatening behaviors including this year’s missile launches and underground nuclear tests. The new bloc presented by the ASEAN community of Asian nations may curtail CHINA’s ambitions, but the cohesiveness of the group is undercut by the different developmental levels of its member states. Elites run everything and corruption is normal.

In SOUTH ASIA, AFGHANISTAN remains unstable, with a deteriorating security situation that is likely to result in yet more fighting this year. ISIL’s new Khorasan branch will remain quiescent, but Taliban forces under the leadership of Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansur present a renewed threat. Tensions between INDIA and PAKISTAN remain at an elevated level. In PAKISTAN, Sheikh Hasina’s continuing efforts to undermine the political opposition will provide openings for terror groups like ISIL, which has already claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on foreigners.

IC no longer considers SUB SAHARAN AFRICA’s stability to be badly compromised by the Lords Resistance Army or Al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the threat from Ebola has for the moment abated. However, NIGERIA’s government must still faces a significant challenge from Boko Haram. Long-running political disputes continue in SUDAN and SOUTH SUDAN, and DRC, BURUNDI and CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC are all dealing tensions arising from broken democratic processes. In SOMALIA, the elected government is reliant on African Union support to exert its authority over al-Shabaab forces in regions of the country outside the capital.

In LATIN AMERICA, droughts, gang violence and political instability are all driving migration to the U.S. The Assessment notes that the exodus from CUBA to the U.S. grew by 76 per cent in 2015, driven by the slow pace of economic reform in the country and fears of a U.S. repeal of the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act. VENEZUELA and BRAZIL both face economically-driven political instability.

The full assessment is here: http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf

KT headshot blue jacketKristina Tanasichuk is CEO & Founder of the Government Technology & Services Coalition, a non-profit, non-partisan organization of small and imd-sized companies working in homeland and national security.  She is also the president of InfraGardNCR, a public private partnership between the private sector and the FBI to shari information to protect our nation’s critical infrastructure, and the president and founder of Women in Homeland Security.

ODNI Industry Day March 3

Join GTSC as we prepare for our Smashing the Box Innovation Day on behalf of the Intelligence Community and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  For more information on the Smashing the Box Series, please click here.

Dr. David HoneyDr. David Honey, Director for Science & Technology and Assistant Deputy Director for National Intelligence for Science & Technology for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will brief us on the FY 2016-2020 S&T Strategic Plan for the IC Community.  This briefing is an opportunity to hear about the challenges and strategies that the IC Community will employ to “manage risk and ensure intelligence advantage” over our adversaries.  Read the Strategic Plan here.  This briefing will prepare companies interested in submitting their innovative technologies tfor GTSC’s Smashing the Box Innovation Day in February.  Learn more about this event here.

Who should attend?

Technology Companies and others interested in learning about S&T’s direction, those interested in submitting a proposal to GTSC’s Smashing the Box Innovation Day with S&T in early 2016, and contractors interested in understanding the S&T mission for the IC community.

REGISTER HERE

More About Dr. Honey:

Dr. David Honey serves as the Director for Science & Technology and Assistant Deputy Director for National Intelligence for Science & Technology for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Dr. David A. Honey joined the DoD’s Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering as the Director for Research on 31 August 2009. Dr. Honey was responsible for policy and oversight of DoD Science and Technology programs from Basic Research through Advanced Technology Development. He was also responsible for oversight of DoD laboratories, ensuring the long-term strategic direction of the Department’s S&T programs, and for developing those technologies needed for continued technological superiority of US forces. Before assuming this position Dr. Honey was the General Manager and Senior Vice President of the Defense Sector for Information Systems Laboratories (ISL), a small business pursuing science and engineering innovations in the fields of advanced sensors, communications, UAVs, adaptive signal processing, and undersea warfare technology. Dr. Honey also served on the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. Dr. Honey was the Director of the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Strategic Technology Office (STO), Director of the Advanced Technology Office (ATO), and Deputy Director and Program Manager of the Microsystems Technology Office (MTO). While at DARPA he led efforts in optoelectronics, networks, communications, information assurance, network-centric-warfare applications, information assurance, sensor systems, space and near-space sensors and structures, maritime technology, underground facility detection and characterization, alternative energy, and chemical-biological defense.

 

Mitigating the Insider Threat Through Personnel Surety Counterintelligence

The Department of Homeland Security in coordination with US Customs and Border Protection are at the forefront of preventing insider threats within its law enforcement operations. These threats take the form of overt actions because of gaps in coordination and process mistakes that lead to self-created but preventable vulnerabilities.

To assure this continued success, a Personnel Surety Counterintelligence mission must be put in place through a management and implementation functionality that will meet the following objectives:

• Assess and audit the effect of the insider threat through risk analysis threat algorithms

• Establish a collaborative information-sharing personnel surety data base system that tracks action requirements and assigns accountability on a continuous basis

• Build a personnel surety counterintelligence business process into each law enforcement mission area, both operational and technologically supported through stakeholder collaboration

• Create a culture built around a robust personnel surety plan to ensure that a need to share for operational success supersedes the need to protect information

• Identify the insider threat and vulnerabilities through a continual monitoring system of checks and balances

• Counter the inadvertent mistakes that lead to the insider threat through the deployment of technologies that drive mission success and efficiencies

 

Coordinating the Government’s Personnel Surety Mission

The multi-faceted challenges of working in today’s mission-critical environmental and multiple enterprise coordination formats require innovative approaches that stress stakeholder creation and participation with built-in accountability, under an umbrella set of governance parameters. This is especially true in the world of counter-intelligence / insider threat in light of the number of initiatives currently underway to protect the United States government information infrastructure. It is imperative that the following initiatives be established:

• Establishing a government-wide personnel surety process and management discipline supported by standardized and relevant technologies

• Coordinating the activities of multiple operational centers, including sharing information about malicious activity and establishing common operating standards and procedures to: track information sharing, require acknowledgement of information received, and provide reports of counter-actions taken

• Deploying technology advancements in order to counter the threats both from an IT and behavioral perspective

• Engaging the private sector, as a partner, to extend the envelope of protection beyond the government’s firewall in a manner that is clear and manageable to that sector

These initiatives are designed to break the pattern of information silos and to overlay new paradigms that will mandate sharing and accountability to protect lives and critical mission information while providing stakeholders tangible metrics for their participation.

They also address the technology aspects required to support this new paradigm by ensuring that the most appropriate tools are in place, under the most cost-effective basis.

Establishing Enterprise-Level Governance

As recent events have proven, internal barriers may well be the biggest stumbling blocks to “connecting the dots” on a threat and preventing violence.

Deployment of a CBP Enterprise Program Management Office (EPMO) is a successful methodology that will enable CBP to break through such barriers and establish an enterprise-level governance functionality that will assure the success of the insider threat mission. An insider threat EPMO will allow CBP to:

• Coordinate the Counterintelligence Mission Focus across all of the Federal Mexican Police Department

• Deploy technologies that drive mission success and efficiencies

• Establish performance metrics and measurable outcomes linked to meeting the counterintelligence insider threat mission

 

Successfully Deploying the EPMO

A successful Counterintelligence EPMO will require the following focus to its activities:

• Developing and documenting a clear understanding of the mission

• Establishing an executive Governance Board

• Organizing with a focus on meeting the counterintelligence mission

• Deploying operations that protect the mission from internal/external threats

• Leveraging technology to enable the counterintelligence mission

• Establishing a disciplined standards-based foundation

It is critical that CBP establish an EPMO to serve as a central program management body, one which both manages and coordinates core insider threats and counterintelligence activities. The EPMO performs much of the program management related work for individual programs as well as the organization at an enterprise level, while still valuing the individual program contributions and objectives.

Establishing and sustaining this focus for the EPMO will require that four themes be addressed: statutory and other mandatory drivers, organization and supporting processes, technology requirements, and cultural change.

1. Statutory and Other Mandatory Drivers

Any EPMO is responsive to the statutory and / or regulatory drivers that established the mission for a sponsoring agency, augmented by internal agency directives or other mandated requirements. It is critical that information on these be gathered, analyzed, and clearly understood. After this it must be coalesced into a charter statement that all stakeholders will commit to support and follow under a program organization that has been developed and accepted in a collaborative process. Specific mission performance objectives may then be developed. Successful implementation of these is a function of establishing a common operating environment that has two components: process and supporting technology.

2. Organization/Process

The processes defining the EPMO’s operating framework must promote the effectiveness, efficiencies, and collaboration necessary to successfully meet the established counterintelligence insider threat mission. Once established, these characteristics must be sustained by adopting a regular process or review through which the operational and control processes of the EPMO are assessed, revised and opportunities for improvement are incorporated. The effective EPMO deploys Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) measuring key processes, especially those that touch the counterintelligence insider threat customer.

The EPMO monitors the KPIs to identify reductions in performance, and as a result, to proactively deploy revised and improved processes. Incorporation of standards and ratings to insure ongoing performance maturity is essential in order to ensure that the stakeholders of the EPMO are receiving the best information and are participating in decision-making as appropriate.

3. Technology

Even while most EPMOs operate in a highly automated environment, the successful counterintelligence insider threat EPMO team understands the use of technology is not the answer to all problems. That team also understands that well-deployed technology remains a critical, but supporting, component to highly qualified personnel and a well-run EPMO organization.

These technologies should be “smart”, scalable, flexible, extensible, and self-monitoring. The requirements for deployment must be based on the automation of a collection of previously manual processes and should provide short-term tactical efficiencies in response time, effectiveness, and productivity. It cannot disrupt processes, unless it is part of a well-understood process improvement strategy. It must be well understood and require users and customers to be well-trained and able to quickly incorporate the technology capabilities into the responsibilities assigned to them.

4. Culture

The EPMO must be staffed by program, change, technology, and counterintelligence professionals who are directly accountable to the counterintelligence mission and to the Department’s strategic objectives. The individuals in the EPMO must have the necessary credentials, as well as managerial, consultative and functional counterintelligence experience, necessary to operate a Department level counterintelligence program office. While necessity often requires that personnel and resources are gathered from other parts of the Department, once those resources are assigned or brought into the EPMO, the mission of the EPMO takes precedence; any adherence to previous cultural and organizational barriers become of secondary priority.

The above four goals must be addressed via a specific implementation process consisting of three primary phases: Initiation, Planning, and Execution, coupled with ongoing Assessment and Update once all facets of the EPMO have been deployed. Each phase has its own input requirements and results in deliverables which are critical to day-to-day execution of the mission objectives.

The advantages of this phased approach are multiple:

• An over-arching mission definition is established, to ensure that all participating agencies are operating to the same goals and objectives

• Agency and other users are provided hands-on guidance to support them through collaborative / facilitated involvement and integration into the counter- intelligence program

• EPMO establish standards, processes and performance measures as well as measuring tools

• Agencies left with flexibility in the management of individual counter- intelligence activities while adhering to enterprise business rules

• Some impact on organization and may require changes in organization structure and / or roles and responsibilities

• Relieves agencies and program teams of much of the responsibility and details of program management-related activities

• Allows users to focus on the counterintelligence activities, resolution of technical issues, and threat adjudication under a common set of ground rules and information-sharing environments

Conclusion

The need for a successful counterintelligence program demands a direct approach to establishing coordination. Therefore, the Counterintelligence / Insider threat EPMO would provide the most robust construct for securing enterprise wide coordination and help break down the organizational silos preventing success. The EPMO will provide a personnel security program as well as counterintelligence / insider threat coordination to the entire enterprise:  from the Executive level to managers, to Federal Officers, to professional staff, to security personnel, to IT personnel, and finally, to IT Security personnel down to administrative and clerical staff.

Contributing Author:

BillCarrollBill Carroll is a co-founder and the President of the EnProVera Corporation, a Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business and Native American Owned Small Disadvantaged Business.  Prior to EnProVera, he was the Managing Partner of Strikeforce Consulting.  Bill has over 40 years of experience in law enforcement, in the U.S. Government, and in the Government Contracting Industry.  He retired from the U.S. Government in 1998 after a distinguished career in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  Bill was the Director of the INS Washington District Office and Deputy Director of the Los Angeles District Office. 

 

 

THE PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSESSMENT REPORT: WHAT DOES IT REALLY TELL US? A CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICERS’ PERSPECTIVE

The week of April 7, 2014, with little notice or fanfare, the Department of Homeland Security issued its first annual Executive Order 13636 Privacy and Civil Liberties Assessment Report 2014. The report addresses the privacy and civil liberties impacts of certain agencies’ undertakings with respect to critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience. It is revealing as much for what it says, as it doesn’t say, with regard to the protection of privacy and civil liberties in the Executive Branch. The report is a study of contrasting approaches to privacy and civil liberties among first tier federal agencies.

On February 12, 2013, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, and Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. Combined, the documents call for the federal government to work with the private sector to strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation’s infrastructure – the vast majority of which is privately owned – and do so in a way that protects the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.

As set forth in the EO 13636 Report, departments and agencies are required to do the following:

  • Develop a technology-neutral voluntary cybersecurity framework;
  • Promote and incentivize the adoption of cybersecurity practices;
  • Increase the volume, timeliness, and quality of cyber threat information sharing;
  • Explore the use of existing regulation to promote cyber security; and
  • Incorporate strong privacy and civil liberties protections into every initiative to secure our CI.

Additionally, PPD-21 requires that departments and agencies:

  • Develop a situational awareness capability that addresses both physical and cyber aspects of how infrastructure is functioning in near-real time;
  • Understand the cascading consequences of infrastructure failures;
  • Evaluate and mature the public-private partnership;
  • Update the National Infrastructure Protection Plan to take into account cyber aspects of infrastructure; and
  • Develop a comprehensive research and development plan.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead agency under the EO and PPD. And, under Section 5 of the Executive Order, Chief Privacy Officer and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of DHS, in consultation with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, are responsible for issuing a privacy and civil liberties assessment, with contributions from the privacy and civil liberties officials of the other agencies covered under the Executive Order (the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Health and Human Services (HHS), Justice, Transportation, Treasury, and Energy; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI); and the General Services Administration (GSA)).

“Protections” include the Fair Information Practice Principles and any other privacy or civil liberties policies, principles or frameworks. The Fair Information Practice Principles to be used are those found in Appendix A of the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, which mirrors the DHS Fair Information Practices (FIPPs), set forth in DHS Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum 2008-1, The Fair Information Practice Principles: Framework for Privacy Policy at the Department of Homeland Security.

At close to 50 pages, DHS’s section was the most comprehensive, robust assessment contained in the report. The two DHS offices addressed their authorities, frameworks, and involvement with the Administration’s critical infrastructure cybersecurity efforts, and then the four areas in which DHS was carrying out its responsibilities under EO 13636 and PDD 21: Cybersecurity Information Sharing–Sharelines; Expansion of the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services Program; the DHS Private Sector Clearance Program; and the DHS Loaned Executive Program. For each of the four areas, the DHS assessment provided a concise discussion of the agency’s actions, past and present, and the implications for privacy and civil liberties. Importantly, DHS addressed in very meaningful ways the circumstances under which it would use PII. After each area, the assessment listed recommendations to DHS, for a total of seven recommendations, many of which encourage increased transparency, oversight, and education.

The other departments and agencies assessments were far shorter, with far less detail. Significantly, many are sector-specific agencies in sectors with vast amounts of PII about American citizens. This month alone, the Government Accounting Office called out the SEC (GAO-14-419) to improve controls over financial systems and data, the IRS (GAO-14-405) and most notably, the overall lax Federal agency response to data breaches involving PII (GAO-14-487T). This sector-specific PII might well be the target of future cyber incidents, and it certainly would be connected to any future incidents, yet most of the other agencies required by the E.O. could only muster cursory assessments under 10 pages in length.

For example, Treasury, the sector-specific agency for banking and finance, lightly assessed its involvement in four pages with three programs, Critical Infrastructure Private Sector Clearance Program, Voluntary Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Program, and Identification of Critical Infrastructure at Greatest Risk. Treasury provided no meaningful discussion of the FIPPs in its assessment, a requirement of the Executive Order.

Defense assessed of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). Specific initiatives included: the DIB Cyber Security/Information Assurance (CS/IA) Program and the DIB Enhanced Cyber Security Services (DECS). Importantly, Defense noted that a “specific cyber incident may include PII that is incidental to, or embedded in, the information the DIB company has shared with [Defense] for cyber security analysis.” In the absence of a list of affected DIB companies, and the type and amount of PII that could be the subject of a cyber incident, the Defense assessment failed to provide a meaningful discussion of the privacy impacts associated with such sharing.

Justice’s assessment was surprisingly short, four pages, especially given that the Justice Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer is a senior position within the Department and an equal of DHS’s Chief Privacy Officer. The Justice assessment focused on iGuardian, “an unclassified web portal designed to accept cyber intrusion complaints from the private sector.” As the ACLU noted, Justice’s remark that only information that is “relevant” is maintained is dubious in a post-Snowden world, given that all information in the digital realm may be relevant to law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

Commerce’s very brief assessment focused on the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) work on the Cybersecurity Framework in collaboration with industry. In fairness to Commerce, NIST has not yet issued its final version of the Framework, arguably limiting its ability to provide a thorough assessment of NIST’s efforts.

HHS – the sector-specific agency for health care – assessment ever so briefly touched on the various aspects of EO 13636 and PPD 21 with which it was involved: Cybersecurity Information Sharing; Cybersecurity Framework; Voluntary Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Program; and Identification of Critical Infrastructure at Greatest Risk. Transportation was the same, lightly touching on: Cybersecurity Information Sharing; Development of Cybersecurity Framework; The Cybersecurity Framework; Voluntary Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Program; and Identification of Critical Infrastructure at Risk. Energy’s assessment focused on its PPD-21 responsibilities related to the energy sector. Surprisingly, Energy failed to discuss those responsibilities from a civil liberties perspective.

ODNI assessed the implications of its issuance of “instructions for the Intelligence Community (IC) to ensure the timely production of unclassified cyber products to the U.S. homeland that identify a specific targeted entity”, otherwise known as “tearlines.” The ODNI assessment provided a passable discussion on the FIPPs, but in transitioning to the agency’s Intelligence Community responsibilities, it appeared to be accepting as true that any already collected PII was properly corrected. In light of the Snowden revelations and the bulk collection of telecommunications and internet service provider data, this part of the assessment rings hollow.

Finally, GSA addressed its responsibilities under the EO to work with Defense to make recommendations “on the feasibility, security benefits, and relative merits of incorporating security standards into acquisition planning and contract administration.” GSA came to the remarkable conclusion that its joint report with Defense on acquisition “does not directly impact privacy and civil liberties as personally identifiable information (PII) is not collected, used, or disseminated.”

Taken as a whole, it is clear that privacy is not protected in an equal fashion across the Executive Branch. Many agencies do not grasp the policy implications of the FIPPs. Some did not even bother to address them. Lastly, there was an overall lack of transparency in the agencies’ critical infrastructure cybersecurity efforts. And that may be the most important aspect of this report: it shows how far tier one agencies have to go to get privacy right.

Contributing Author:  Hugo Teufel

Hugo TeufelHugo Teufel is the former Chief Privacy Officer of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  An attorney, he assists public and private sector clients in a wide range of areas including privacy and security; investigations, compliance, and corporate governance; defense and homeland and national security; government contracts formation, administration and litigation.

Michael P. Jackson joins GTSC as Steering Committee Chair

GTSC today announced that Michael P. Jackson, CEO of Vidsys (www.vidsys.com) and Former Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation has joined the Coalition leadership as Chair of the Steering Committee. Jackson, the CEO of a small business working in the homeland and national security space, joins GTSC’s leadership to “share innovative, pragmatic lessons learned from small and mid-sized businesses serving public agencies responsible for essential security missions.” Read the press release here.

Dec. 12: The National Security Supply Chain: Reducing the Vulnerabilities

Join the Government Technology & Services Coalition (GTSC) for a program featuring an overview of acquisition, technology and innovation in the intelligence community to both assure we have the most advanced protections in place to mitigate our vulnerabilities, and the most recent tools and information on how to protect intellectual property, prevent insider threats and understand supply chain considerations in the government contracting environment.  Keynote Frank Montoya, Jr., National Counterintelligence Executive, Office of the Director of National Intelligence will keynote with a preview of the 2013 Economic Espionage Report (EER).

AGENDA AT A GLANCE
 
12:00 PM Welcome & Introductions
  • Kristina Tanasichuk, CEO, GTSC
  • Elena Kim-Mitchell, Director, Private Sector Outreach, ODNI

 

12:10 PM ODNI Movie

12:30 PM – 1:30 PMKeynote Luncheon:Preview of the 2013 Economic Espionage Report
Frank Montoya, Jr., Counterintelligence Executive, ONCIX

1:30 PM – 2:00 PM CERT & Insider Threat

Randy Trzeciak Senior Member of the Technical Staff, Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI), CERT Program, Carnegie Mellon University

2:00 PM – 3:00 PM Best Practices on Insider Threats & Supply Chain Security

  • Joan McCarroll, Director, Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Center of Excellence
  • Kathy Mills, Corporate Security Officer/Security Director, CENTRA Technology, Inc.

3:00PM – 3:30PM Cyber Threats & Vulnerabilities to Small & Mid-Sized Companies

3:30 PM – 4:15 PM Acquisition, Technology & Innovation
Dr. David A. Honey, Ph.D., Director for Science & Technology, Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Science & Technology, ODNI

4:15PM – 5:00 PM What Can Business Do?

  • DHS Business Continuity tool
  • FBI Resources
Keynote: Dr. David A. Honey, Director for Science & Technology, Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Science & Technology, ODNI
Dr. David Honey serves as the Director for Science & Technology and Assistant Deputy Director for National Intelligence for Science & Technology for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Dr. David A. Honey joined the DoD’s Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering as the Director for Research on 31 August 2009. Dr. Honey was responsible for policy and oversight of DoD Science and Technology programs from Basic Research through Advanced Technology Development. He was also responsible for oversight of DoD laboratories, ensuring the long-term strategic direction of the Department’s S&T programs, and for developing those technologies needed for continued technological superiority of US forces. Before assuming this position Dr. Honey was the General Manager and Senior Vice President of the Defense Sector for Information Systems Laboratories (ISL), a small business pursuing science and engineering innovations in the fields of advanced sensors, communications, UAVs, adaptive signal processing, and undersea warfare technology. Dr. Honey also served on the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. Dr. Honey was the Director of the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Strategic Technology Office (STO), Director of the Advanced Technology Office (ATO), and Deputy Director and Program Manager of the Microsystems Technology Office (MTO). While at DARPA he led efforts in optoelectronics, networks, communications, information assurance, network-centric-warfare applications, information assurance, sensor systems, space and near-space sensors and structures, maritime technology, underground facility detection and characterization, alternative energy, and chemical-biological defense.

Keynote: Frank Montoya, Jr., Counterintelligence Executive, Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) 

Frank Montoya, Jr. began his career as an FBI special agent in May 1991 and reported to the San Antonio Field Office, where he worked violent crime and fugitive investigations. He established and led activities of the division’s fugitive task force. Montoya also worked temporarily in the Oklahoma City Field Office to assist in the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing investigation. In April 2000, Montoya was promoted and worked at FBI Headquarters. He oversaw national security investigations and operations. During this time, he assisted in the Robert Hanssen investigation. Montoya transferred to the Milwaukee Field Office in November 2002. He served as supervisor and oversaw the counterintelligence squad and several national security investigations. Montoya returned to FBI Headquarters in December 2005, was promoted to unit chief in the Counterintelligence Division, and participated in the establishment of the National Cyber Investigations Joint Task Force. He moved to the West Coast in July 2007 and worked in the San Francisco Field Office as assistant special agent in charge in the counterintelligence branch.

Joan McCarroll, Director, Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Center of Excellence

In her role as SE&I COE Director, Joan is responsible for establishing and promoting TASC’s best practices and processes in SE&I, program protection and cybersecurity including insider threat analysis.  In her current role, Joan identifies Leading Practices in SE and deploys them across the company resulting in innovative solutions for our customers. In the area of program protection, Joan has expertise in both external and internal threat assessment and protection. Since joining TASC in 1990, Joan has performed and led end-to-end technical efforts in support of operationally deployed systems, systems under development, and future system architecture studies. She has held senior program management positions supporting the intelligence community in secure communications and SIGINT. Joan received her BSEE from Drexel University and her MS in Systems Analysis and Management from George Washington University. She has also attended Executive education courses at Darden and Strategic Marketing at the University of Chicago.


Kathy Mills, Corporate Security Officer/Security Director, CENTRA Technology, Inc.

Kathy joined CENTRA Technology, in November 2008 as the Corporate Security Officer/Security Director.  She is responsible for all aspects of CENTRA’s Security operations, including personnel security, program security, physical security, and Information security, at both CENTRA’s Arlington and Burlington locations. Kathy has over twenty years experience in security including management of day-to-day operational security, personnel management, administration, and maintaining all aspects of a security program under the National Industrial Security Program.

Randy Trzeciak Senior Member of the Technical Staff, Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI), CERT, Carnegie Mellon University

Randy Trzeciak is currently a Senior Member of the technical staff for the Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI) CERT Program. Mr. Trzeciak is a member of a team in CERT focusing on insider threat research. The studies analyze the physical and online behavior of malicious insiders prior to and during network compromises. Other insider threat research uses system dynamics modeling for risk analysis of the impacts of policy decisions, technical security measures, psychological issues, and organizational culture on insider threat. Mr. Trzeciak also is an adjunct professor in Carnegie Mellon’s H. John Heinz School of Public Policy and Management. Prior to his current role in the CERT Program, Mr. Trzeciak managed the Management Information Systems (MIS) team in the Information Technology Department at the SEI. Under his direction, the MIS team developed and supported numerous mission-critical, large-scale, relational database management systems.

 

Register now